基于知识资产控制权优化配置的创新合作研究  

Innovation Collaboration Based on Optimal Allocation of Intellectual Assets

作　　者：李彩凤[1,2,3] 刘新梅[1,2] 耿紫珍[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院 [2]西安交通大学过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,西安710049 [3]西安邮电大学管理工程学院,西安710061

出　　处：《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第1期105-109,共5页Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：西安交通大学“985工程”项目(07200701);过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室资助项目;陕西省教育厅专项科研计划资助项目(11JK0062)

摘　　要：服务外包项目中,顾客与服务供应商之间的创新合作易受知识资产剩余控制权无效配置的限制,已有研究根据GHM模型中的一次性静态博弈分析结论去研究顾客与供应商之间的创新合作,无法有效预测长期合作关系下顾客与供应商建立起信誉机制后,基于重复博弈所做出的行为决策。故建立重复博弈模型,在顾客与供应商之间,基于知识资产剩余控制权优化配置的创新合作问题中引入信誉机制的作用,分析了无限重复博弈和有限重复博弈两种情形下顾客与供应商之间,基于知识资产剩余控制权优化配置的创新合作的实现条件。结论表明,当顾客与服务供应商之间建立起长期合作关系时,信誉机制的作用能够促使外包项目中知识资产的剩余控制权得到优化配置。Customer-supplier innovation collaboration in the service outsourcing project can not be realized be- cause of inefficient allocation of intellectual assets. Prior work studied the innovation collaboration between custom- er and supplier based on the one shot static game in the GHM model, ignoring that the behavioral decision-making during innovation collaboration of customer and supplier often happens in a long-term situation related to repeated game under a reputation mechanism. This paper studies the problem of customer-supplier innovation collaboration based on the optimal allocation of intellectual assets by analyzing both the infinitely repeated game and the finitely repeated game under the reputation mechanism. The results show that, when the customer has long-term relation- ship with the supplier, the effect of the reputation mechanism enables the innovation cooperation to occur smoothly.

关 键 词：信誉机制 知识资产 剩余控制权 创新合作 重复博弈 

分 类 号：F719.1[经济管理—产业经济]