CEO权力、董事会治理与公司冒险倾向  

CEO 's Power,Board Governance and Company's Risk-taking Propensity

作　　者：吴卫华[1] 万迪昉[1] 吴祖光[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2014年第1期99-107,127-128,共9页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于金融契约及机制设计的中国金融衍生品交易市场自律监管的研究"(71173166)和"基于动态不完全契约的中国经济转型期金融期货市场风险监控研究"(71373202);陕西省教育厅人文社科研究计划项目"政府支持与企业研发投入的关系及其影响因素研究--以创业板上市公司为例"(2013JK0107)

摘　　要：从CEO风险规避行为视角出发,实证研究了CEO权力对上市公司冒险倾向的影响,并检验了董事会治理机制对公司冒险倾向和CEO权力之间关系的调节作用。研究发现:上市公司冒险倾向与CEO权力之间负相关,企业高管权力过大会加重代理问题,降低高管风险承担意愿,公司表现出较低的冒险倾向;董事会独立性并不明显影响公司冒险倾向与CEO权力之间的关系;董事会持股对公司冒险倾向与CEO权力之间的关系起到负向调节作用,董事会持股比例越高,则公司冒险倾向与CEO权力之间的负相关关系越弱。因此,通过改善董事会治理机制,能够缓解管理层过度保守的经营行为,提高股东价值。In the perspective of CEO's risk aversion behavior,this paper studies the influence of CEO's power on company's risk-taking propensity and examines the regulating effect of board governance mechanisms on the above-mentioned relationship. The empirical results show that: the company's risk-taking propensity has a negative correlation with CEO power,which indicates that oversized CEO's power will aggravate the agency problem and reduce the executives' adventure willingness and the company shows a lower risk-taking tendency; board's independence does not significantly affect the negative correlation between company's risk-taking propensity and CEO power; the shareholding of board of directors can negatively regulate the relationship between firm risk-taking propensity and CEO power,that is,the higher the stake of the board,the weaker the negative correlation between company's risk-taking propensity and CEO power. Therefore,we can relieve the over-conservative behavior of management and increase the shareholder's value by improving board governance mechanism.

关 键 词：CEO权力 公司治理 公司冒险倾向 风险规避行为 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F272.91F224