金融约束、政府干预与农村信用联社不良资产的形成机理研究——基于陕西省农村信用联社的实证分析  

Research on the Mechanism of the Formation of Non-performing Loans under the Rural Credit Cooperative: Based on the Empirical Analysis of Shaanxi Rural Credit Cooperative

作　　者：李富有[1] 李新军[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《统计与信息论坛》2014年第1期81-86,共6页Journal of Statistics and Information

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目<民间资本供求风险防范及其健康发展研究>(12&ZD071)

摘　　要：基于国家理性假设,运用制度经济学与微观经济学的原理分析了农信社不良资产形成机理,并以陕西农村信用联社为例进行实证研究,研究认为,国家、地方政府及企业本身对应于三个不同利益主体和矛盾冲突,地方政府干预是形成不良资产的主要原因;不良资产与农民收入负相关,与地方财政赤字不相关,但与资本充足率正相关。因此,要通过中央、地方与农信社三方面共同努力,防范和化解不良资产。It is the key to resolve the problem of the non-performing assets ot rural cremt cooperauves. Based on the assumption of rationality of state, this dissertation analyzes the formation mechanism of non-performing assets of rural credit cooperatives using the principle of Institutional economics and microcosmic economics. Taking the case of Shaanxi rural credit cooperation, it draws a conclusion- the first, the state, local government and enterprise are respectively corresponding to three different subiects of interests, so creates potential conflicts of interest conflict; the second, local government ~ntervention is the main reason for the formation of non-performing assets, but non-performing assets and income of the farmers is negative. The result of this experiment was not noticeable local fiscal deficit; but the positive correlation to the capital adequacy ratio. Therefore, it takes three aspects of efforts through cooperation of the central government.local government and rural credit to prevent and dissolve the non-performing assets from the system.

关 键 词：农信社 国家理性假设 不良资产 金融约束 实证分析 

分 类 号：F832.35[经济管理—金融学]