模糊环境下Stackelberg博弈的均衡利润分析  

Analysis of equilibrium profit of Stackelberg game under fuzzy environment

作　　者：晋盛武[1] 丁浩然[1] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学经济学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第1期119-124,共6页Journal of Hefei University of Technology：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273082);教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(11YJA630039)

摘　　要：文章研究了模糊环境下需求和成本为三角模糊数的斯坦克尔伯格(Stackelberg)模型,利用加权重心的思想将模糊利润函数转化为确定性估值,依据确定性估值最优确定厂商的产量,每个厂商在模糊均衡时都没有动机去改变均衡的结果。结果表明:在模糊环境下,斯坦克尔伯格模型中领导厂商需要满足一定的条件才能保持先动优势,模糊参数变动对领导厂商和追随厂商的均衡产量和均衡利润的影响存在较大的差异性。The Stackelberg model with fuzzy demand and fuzzy costs that are assumed to be triangular fuzzy numbers is analyzed. The model utilizes the weighted center of gravity（WCoG） method to de- fuzzily the fuzzy profit function into deterministic value. The equilibrium Stackelberg quantity of each firm is derived by solving the first-order condition of follower and leader. In addition, the standard de- viation of the fuzzy profit of each firm is gotten. The results show that the leader firm needs to meet certain conditions to maintain the first mover advantage under a fuzzy environment. It is found that the effect of parameter perturbations has a great difference between the leader firm＇s equilibrium quantity and profit and the follower firm＇s through the sensitivity analysis of the standard deviation.

关 键 词：三角模糊数 斯坦克尔伯格模型 均衡产量 均衡利润 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]