莱布尼茨的实体思想及其意义  

Leibniz's thought of substance and its significance

作　　者：张璐[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院,北京100875

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2014年第2期76-81,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金面上资助(116825);中国博士后基金特别资助(116825)

摘　　要：莱布尼茨的实体思想是其庞大哲学体系的基石。他认为笛卡尔的广延概念既"复杂"又"相对","我思故我在"除了主体的思还存在"外在的多样化基础";斯宾诺莎的"上帝即自然"的思想也面临实体多样化的难题。莱布尼茨是在批判地继承笛卡尔和斯宾诺莎的实体思想上提出了独具特色的实体观,在他看来,实体不仅包括元级作为主导单子(主动力),还包括有机形体(被动力),二者构成有形实体,有形实体构成现实世界。单子不能被分割,也不存在部分,但是单子与有机形体是必然统一并共在。莱布尼茨的有形实体观不仅为活力的自然找到了基础,而且也为身心问题提供了答案;不仅对自由意志的可能提供了坚实的基础,也为后世理论的发展提供了思想资源。The thought of substance is the footstone of Leibniz＇s vast philosophical system. He said the concept of Cartesian extension is ＂complex＂ and ＂relative＂, ＂I think therefore I am＂ includes not only ＂I, who perceive.＂ But also ＂the things I perceive are various＂ ; Spinoza＇s ＂God is nature＂ has the problem of multiplicity. Leibniz gives the unique theory of substance on the critical inheritance of thoughts of Descartes and Spinoza. Accord ing to Leibniz, substance contains not only entelechy as dominate monad （primary force） but also organic body （passive force）. Both combined to a cor poreal substance, which constitute the actual world. Monad cannot be split, so it has no part, but monad and organic body must be united and existed together. The thought of substance of Leibniz not only gives a foundation of vivid nature, but also gives an answer to the problem of body and mind, which not only provides a solid foundation for human free will, but also leaves much resources to the following theoretical development.

关 键 词：关键字 莱布尼茨 元极 原初物质 有形实体 单子 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]