国有控股上市公司管理层关联方持股“隧道效应”实现路径及其测度  

The “Tunneling Effect” of State Holding Listed Company's Managerial Ownership in Affiliate Companies:Realizing Route and Measurement

作　　者：吕凡[1] 余玉苗[2] 杨洋[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州大学管理学院,贵州贵阳550000 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2013年第12期77-79,129,共3页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划基金项目"国有控股上市公司管理层关联方持股的隧道效应研究"(项目编号:10YJA790236);贵州省教育厅项目(项目编号:10JD12);国家社科基金项目"我国国有企业高管薪酬制度改革研究"(项目编号:10BGL067)的资助

摘　　要：国有控股上市公司管理层在关联方持股的现象日趋增多,极易诱使管理层通过关联交易的隐蔽途径,向自己输送不当利益,即产生所谓"隧道效应"问题。本文分析了管理层关联方持股的隧道行为和股权激励动因,指出了"隧道效应"的实现路径与表现形式,并用理论模型对"隧道效应"的程度进行了初步测度,从加强相关信息披露、推进国有企业股权激励制度改革、培育职业经理人市场等方面提出了治理建议。The 'Tunneling Effect'of state holding listed company's managerial ownership in affiliate companies is likely to be a new channel for the loss of state assets.This paper first analyzes the motives of managerial ownership in affiliate company to hold shares.And then based on the case study of our capital market,the author lists the forms of 'Tunneling Effect'and measures it through a theoretical model.Aiming to prevent the loss of state assets through 'Tunneling Effect',this paper expatiates counterplan from the following perspectives,namely,enhancing information disclosure,deepening stock incentive system in state-owned enterprises and cultivating professional manager market.

关 键 词：管理层关联方持股 隧道效应 关联交易 国有控股上市公司 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F272.91F224