中国碳排放权初始配额分配机制研究  

Research on Adverse Selection in Initial Quota Allocation of Carbon Emission Trading

作　　者：于立宏[1] 周一帆[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

出　　处：《经济管理学刊（中英文版）》2013年第5期167-175,共9页Economic Management Journal

基　　金：基金资助：受国家杰出青年基金（71125002）,国家自科基金（碳强度目标下可再生能源发电产业链的定价机制研究.71273091）,教育部人文社科基金项目（基于产业链的太阳能发电政策研究,11YJA790068）资助.

摘　　要：中国应对气候变化的一系列政策正在逐步推进。随着CDM项目的日渐势微，建立碳排放权交易市场成为最主要的政策工具。然而，在碳交易机制设计中，初始配额如何分配既是重点又是难点。采取免费分配初始配额方式的欧盟遇到了配额供给过剩、价格大幅下跌等问题，主要原因是政府和企业在协商谈判过程中的信息不对称，使得政府在制定减排目标和分配初始配额时难以对企业施加硬约束。本文运用逆向选择理论分析了上述问题的成因，并提出可以基于减排的技术特性而设计菜单式减排合约，以实现企业类型的甄别，强化企业面临的减排约束，提高规制效果。A series of policies proposed by China to cope with climate change has been gradually advancing. As CDM projects have potential problems, the establishment of carbon emissions trading market has become the priority. However, how to distribute the initial quota is the key and difficulty in the carbon trading mechanism design. As the world＇s largest carbon trading market, EU greenhouse gas emissions trading system （EU ETS） which takes free initial quota allocation has encountered some problems, such as quota supply surplus, price sharp fall, etc, mainly resulting from information asymmetry between government and enterprises in the process of negotiating, which makes government difficult to pressure hard constraints onto the enterprises in the process of emission reduction and distribution of the initial quota. This paper employed reverse choice theory to analyze the causes of this kind of problems, and then put forward menu type reduction contract based on the technical characteristics of the emissions reduction, so as to realize discriminating the enterprise type, strengthen reduction constraint enterprises face, and improve the regulation effect.

关 键 词：碳排放权交易 信息不对称 逆向选择 信息甄别 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]