上市公司会计信息披露的博弈分析及其政府规制  

Game Analysis of Accounting Information Disclosure of Listed Companies and the Government Regulation

作　　者：严小明[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学商学院,上海200042

出　　处：《经济管理学刊（中英文版）》2013年第5期202-207,共6页Economic Management Journal

摘　　要：本文基于对我国上市公司公开披露会计信息普遍失真的现状分析，构建了上市公司与中小投资者的会计信息披露的信号传递博弈模型。通过对该模型精练贝叶斯均衡的分析，证明了如果政府对上市公司会计信息披露监管乏力，那么上市公司会计信息披露时就存在混同均衡。即上市公司无论财务状况好坏，都会选择披露好的会计信息。而投资者都会选择投资的策略。因此需要政府监管部门对上市公司的会计信息披露进行强有力监管和规制。政府监管部门可以从三个方面采取措施有效解决会计信息披露的混同均衡现象。一是加大上市公司虚假会计信息披露的查出概率0；二是加大对会计信息造假的上市公司的惩罚力度Y；三是加大会计信息造假的上市公司对投资者的赔偿力度X。在政府规制后，政府对会计信息虚假披露上市公司收取的罚款Y，和上市公司对被欺骗的投资者的赔偿X均充分大时（使：B1＋E1-C〈θX和11-B2-CF〈θY＋θX均成立），上市公司会计信息披露的信号传递博弈存在分离均衡。即回报率高的优质上市公司就会选择披露回报率高的会计信息，投资者选择投资，回报率低的劣质上市公司就会选择披露回报率低的会计信息，投资者选择不投资。Based on the prevailing distortion of accounting information disclosure of listed companies in China, this paper constructed a signaling game model between listed company and medium and small investors about accounting information disclosure. Through the refined Bayesian equilibrium of the game model, it is that if the government supervision is absent on accounting information disclosure of listed companies, there is pooling equilibrium that financial status of listed company is no matter good or bad, that is to say, the listed company will disclose good accounting information, and thus investors can choose investment strategy. So the strict oversight and regulation taken by government regulators are required on the listed companies＇ accounting information disclosure in terms of the following three aspects to effectively solve the pooling equilibrium of accounting information disclosure of listed companies： First is to increase the odds 0 of false accounting information disclosure of listed companies; then the aggravation of fraud penalties Y on listed companies due to their false accounting information; finally, the rise of compensation X for victims of false accounting information. After the government regulation, when penalties Y and compensation X are sufficiently large, B 1 ＋ E 1 - C 〈 θX and I 1 -B 2 -C F 〈 θY ＋ θX . The signaling game of accounting information disclosure of listed companies shows separating equilibrium that listed companies with high return will disclose high rate return accounting information, then outside investors invest; otherwise, not.

关 键 词：信号传递博弈 混同均衡 分离均衡 政府规制 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]