异质劳动、分工和报酬决定:一个垄断竞争模型  

Labor Heterogeneity, Determination of Labor Division and Payments:A Monopolistic Competition Model

作　　者：蔡继明[1] 高宏[1] 李亚鹏 

机构地区：[1]清华大学政治经济学研究中心 [2]郑州商品交易所

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2014年第1期3-12,共10页China Economic Studies

摘　　要：本文在广义价值论框架下以劳动异质性为前提阐释了垄断竞争市场条件下分工和报酬的决定。通过构建包含家庭和企业两部门的一般均衡模型,本文分析了劳动者分别从事个体劳动(或家务劳动)、雇佣劳动和经营企业各自获得的实物报酬,由此依据相对实物报酬的高低决定专业化分工的方向,并最终确定均衡的交换比例。这种分工结果在垄断竞争条件下实现了社会成员的总体福利最大化。比较静态分析结果表明,垄断势力的增加,导致部分雇佣工人转变为个体劳动者(或家务劳动者)或企业家,这掩盖了部分劳动者的比较优势,降低了人力资源配置效率。Based on the general theory of value, this paper expounds the determination of division of labor and return in the monopolistic competitive market on the premise of labor heterogeneity. By establishing a general equilibrium model with households and firms, this paper studies the in-kind payments of homework, workers and entrepreneurs. Therefore, the relative in-kind payments determine the division of labor and exchange rate. The result of labor division maximizes the social welfare in the monopolistic competitive market. Comparative static analysis shows that an increase in monopoly power lead to workers to work in home or to be entrepreneurs and hence inefficiency of human resource allocation.

关 键 词：劳动异质性 分工 实物报酬 广义价值论 

分 类 号：F014.2[经济管理—政治经济学] F224