国家审计提升政治信任的机理和路径  

The Mechanism and Approaches of Political Trust in National Auditing

作　　者：陈希晖[1,2] 陈良华[1] 李鹏[3] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院 [2]南京审计学院现代审计发展研究中心,邮政编码210036 [3]浙江工商大学财务与会计学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2014年第1期18-23,共6页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家社科基金(10BGL060和11BGL062)的阶段性成果;江苏高校优势学科建设工程(PAPD)资助

摘　　要：本文以"塔西佗陷阱"为切入点,分析了国家审计、政治信任和国家治理的关系。政治信任与国家治理相辅相成,国家审计具有提升政治信任的功能,通过提升公众的政治信任实现善治。结合政治信任"悖论",剖析了国家审计通过揭示、预防和抵御机制提升政治信任的机理,并从政党、政府、政府官员、政策制度等四个维度的视角阐述了国家审计提升政治信任的路径;以此为基础描述了政治信任视角下国家审计的六大发展趋势。On the basis of Tacitus trap, this paper analyzes the relationship of national auditing, political trust and national governance. Political trust and national governance should be complementary to each other. National audi- ting has the ruction of promoting political trust. It promotes the public political trust and then carries out good gov- ernance. In combination with the ＂political trust paradox＂, this paper also discusses how national auditing promotes political trust by means of disclosure mechanism, preventive mechanism and defensive mechanism and expounds the approaches to promote political trust from the prospect of political parties, governments , governmental officials and governmental policies. Finally, the paper depicts the six directions of the development of national auditing from the viewpoint of political trust.

关 键 词：国家审计 政治信任 塔西佗陷阱 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学]