旅游供应链中供货商与投机商的收益协调研究  

Study on the Supplier and Speculator's Revenue Coordination in Tourism Supply Chain

作　　者：周垂日[1] 吴钰[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学,合肥230026

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》2013年第6期36-40,共5页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630415)

摘　　要：作为供货商的海洋馆在市场中存在投机商的情况下销售门票,海洋馆在游客数量不确定之前就要制定门票价格以及出售给投机商的折扣价格,游客具有异质性,投机商进入市场的目的纯粹是为了贩卖,如果最后显示游客数量较大,那么投机商就有利可图。通过对模型的分析与求解,得到了在集中决策和独立决策下折扣水平的差异,研究表明,当游客服从均匀分布时,供应链集中决策时的总收益大于独立决策时的总收益;通过对折扣水平的协调,可以实现旅游供应链整体收益的最大化以及博弈双方的各自收益的最大化;最后通过一个算例证明了结论。This paper studies aquarium selling tickets to the tourists when speculators existing in the market. The aquarium sets a price and discount before demand uncertainty is resolved, and since the tourists are heterogeneous, speculators may enter the market purely with the intention of resale, which can be profitable if demand turns out to be high. Through the analysis of the model, we obtain the different discounts under the different situations. Research shows that the total revenue of supply chain in the centralized decision-making is greater than the revenue in independent decision-making when tourists follow uniform distribution. The maximum revenue of supply chain and both parties get their maximum revenue can be realized by coordinating the discount level. Finally, the related conclusions are illustrated by an example.

关 键 词：投机商 游客异质性 收益管理 协调 

分 类 号：F590.65[经济管理—旅游管理]