农户参与式水利管理与政府声誉缺失——一个基于博弈框架的分析  

Farmers Participation and Government Reputaion Loss in Water Conservancy Management——Based on Game Theory

作　　者：张宁[1] 吴春凤[1] 刘聪[2] 

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州310027

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2014年第2期8-12,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71203053);教育部人文社科青年项目(10YJC790382);浙江省人文社科基地项目(ZD01-201301);浙江省社科规划人才项目(11ZJQN002YB)

摘　　要：为解决农户有效参与水利管理的合作意愿,本文基于博弈论的农户合作管理困境,首先对农户参与水利管理的单次静态博弈进行了合作意愿分析,得出农户在合作的单次博弈中必将陷入两难困境,导致个人理性和集体理性产生冲突,农户产生"搭便车"的倾向,且农户集体之间的合作难以达成。其次,基于不完全信息和有限理性的研究假设,再次对农户所处的两难困境进行重复动态博弈分析,推演出农户参与水利管理的合作意愿主要来自政府的有效激励机制设计及承诺。最后,本文以浙江省为例,对500个农户参与水利管理的合作意愿进行了实地调查,结果显示与农户合作博弈过程中的研究结论相符,并据此得出相应的对策及建议。In order to make farmers willing to participate in water management effectively based on game theory about coope-rative and managerial difficulty in village, the relevant department first carries on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management and finds that farmers get into two kinds of Prisoners＇ Dilemma, which can lead to individualrationality conflicting with collective rationality, in a single game. Therefore, farmers would have a tendency to ＂free rides＂, and it is difficult to achieve cooperation among them. Later, based on the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, and carried on the famers＂ repeated dynamic game in order to try to break the two kinds of prisoners＂ dilemma, the result is that famers＂ willingness to cooperate to participate in water management is from effective well-designed incentive system and commitment of the government. Finally, in order to guarantee the rationality of the study, a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in Zhejiang Province is processed, and the case is confirmed that the study is reasonable. Also, there are six important conclusions come out through the analysis of the full text.

关 键 词：博弈 农户参与 水利建设 水利管理 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]