中国式分权、政府治理与农村公共品供给研究——基于省级面板数据FGLS与System-GMM实证  

Study on China's Decentralization,Governance and the Supply of Rural Public Goods——A FGLS & System-GMM Analysis Based on the Provincial Panel Data

作　　者：李雪松[1,2] 冉光和[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学公共管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《预测》2014年第1期33-38,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区资助项目(13XJC790003);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CQDXWL-2012-053;CDJSK11018)

摘　　要：本文基于财政分权与地方政府治理视域对农村公共品供给的影响机制进行了制度根源的理论探析与实证研究。利用1995~2010年省级面板数据经验研究发现：财政分权、城镇化对农村基础教育、卫生保健和福利社保公共品均具有显著的供给效应。中央转移支付并未有效促进农村医疗公共品供给，地方政府财政自给率供给效应不显著，但地方政府对中央转移支付“粘蝇纸效应”明显。政府竞争对农村基础教育与社保支出具有显著的负向激励。反腐败增强了农村基础教育的有效提供，但减少了福利保障供给，说明地方政府在农村公共品供给上具有腐败寻租的空间。经济增长水平与新农村建设政策变量也是影响农村公共品供给效应的重要因素并呈现差异性。政策启示是应持续优化中国式分权制度的顶层设计，提高地方政府的治理水平，完善城乡均衡统筹的公共品供给机制。This study first studies the effect mechanism of the supply of rural public goods from fiscal decentralization and local governance, based on the theoretical analysis and empirical research. By provincial panel data model during 1995~2010, the results suggest that fiscal decentralization and urbanization have a significant supply effect on rural basic education, health care and welfare of social public goods. Transfers from the central government do not effectively promote the supply of public goods in rural medical. The supply effect of local government financial self-sufficiency rate is not significant. But the “flypaper effect” is obvious from local government to central transfers. Government competi-tion has a negative incentive effect on rural basic education and social security expenditure. Anti-corruption enhances the effectiveness of rural basic education, but reduces the welfare supply, which implies that there are some rent-seeking and corruption opportunities. The economic growth and new rural construction policy variables are also important factors, which affect the supply of rural public goods effect and present the difference. This paper also provides some policy implications, such as continuing to optimize the top-level design system of decentralization, improving the level of local governance and supply mechanism of urban and rural equilibrium.

关 键 词：财政分权 政府治理 公共品 面板数据 

分 类 号：F812.8[经济管理—财政学]