中央银行货币政策透明性的作用与边界  

The Effect and Limits of Central Bank Transparency

作　　者：何运信[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学金融学院 [2]浙江财经大学财富管理与量化投资协同创新中心

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2014年第1期52-66,共15页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“居民通货膨胀感受的异质性、偏差及其形成机制”(项目编号:71273224);教育部人文社科基金项目“决定货币政策可信度的特征因素研究”(项目编号:09YJC790236)

摘　　要：文章分析了中央银行在政策目标、决策依据和政策效果评价三方面的透明性对货币政策可信度的影响效应,研究结果表明:保持政策适度透明是偏好于价格稳定的央行用以显示其低通胀偏好,以获得公众信任并稳定其通胀预期的良好机制;央行公布预测不会影响长期平均通胀水平和平均产出,但有助于降低通胀的波动性;受现实约束,最优透明度是有边界的。文章进而提供了支持这些理论结果的强有力的经验证据:各国通胀水平、通胀和产出的波动性在央行货币政策透明度提高以后都有显著的下降;回归分析显示,代表货币政策可信度的通货膨胀波动性与透明度显著负相关,最优透明度处于某个中间水平。This paper analyzes the effect central bank transparency in monetary policy goals, policy - making basis and policy evaluation has on the credibility and impact of monetary policy. We obtain the following theo- retical results ： Central banks, which prefer price stability, can use transparency to show their preference for low inflation to the public, so that they can obtain more public trust and stabilize inflation expectations. Central banks announcing their forecasts in advance does not affect the long - term average inflation and output, but contributes to reducing the volatility of inflation. Central Bank Transparency is limited to constraints or reality. Further, we provides strong empirical evidence that： 1 ） inflation and variations in inflation and output are sig- nificantly reduced after the transparency of monetary policy is improved; 2） some regression analysis showed that variations in inflation variation are significantly negatively correlated with central banks＇ transparency; and 3 ） optimal transparency is at some intermediate level.

关 键 词：货币政策 可信度 透明性 

分 类 号：F820[经济管理—财政学]