零售商资金约束的双渠道供应链决策  

Dual-channel supply chain decision with retailer's capital constraint

作　　者：张小娟[1] 王勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《控制与决策》2014年第2期299-306,共8页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272085);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(12YJA630135);中央高校研究生科技创新基金项目(CDJXS10020001)

摘　　要：考虑一个零售商资金约束的双渠道供应链模型.在信息对称的情况下,根据零售商资金不足问题的解决方式不同,利用Stackelberg博弈理论分别对推迟支付模型和借贷支付模型进行分析,给出了供应商与零售商的最优决策,并证明了零售商选择推迟支付模型不仅可以增加利润,而且有利于其提高市场竞争力、拓展市场,说明了无论供应商的生产预算情况如何,都愿意向零售商提供推迟支付服务的依据.最后,通过数值分析验证了结论的正确性.A dual-channel supply chain model is considered, in which the retailer is capital constrained. In the case of symmetric demand information, according to the different ways for disposing the capital insufficient problem, by using the Stackelberg game theory, the deferred-payment model and the loan-payment model are analyzed respectively, and the optimal decisions of the supplier and retailer are given under the two modes. It is proved that not only the retailer＇s profit can be increased, but also it is conducive to expanding the demand for retailing channel and raising the retailer＇s competitiveness in market, when the retailer chooses to defer its payment for bill. It is showed that no matter how much the producing-budget owns, the supplier is always willing to provide the retailer a deferred-payment policy. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the correctness of the conclusions.

关 键 词：资金约束 双渠道 推迟支付 借贷支付 供应链 

分 类 号：F252.3[经济管理—国民经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]