市场竞争、横向监督与信贷契约治理——基于比较制度实验的研究  

A Comparative Institutional Experimental Research on Market Competition,Lateral Supervision and the Governance of Credit Contract

作　　者：任广乾[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2014年第1期51-60,共10页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金联合基金项目(U1304705);河南省教育厅科学技术研究重点项目(13A630594)资助

摘　　要：本文在信贷契约道德风险起源及其缓解机制探讨基础上,指出了横向监督机制对企业家道德风险行为的规制作用并分析了其原理。采用比较制度实验研究方法,构建了基于计算机局域网的三组并行的实验室实验,分析了三种信贷市场中横向监督机制的治理效率,对比研究了三种竞争状态下的市场绩效和收益分布。结果表明,买方竞争强化了横向监督机制的治理效能,卖方竞争削弱了横向监督机制的治理效能;对称市场的签约比率波动最大,卖方竞争市场的守约比率下降最快;买方竞争市场平均绩效最高且投资者占有了较大比例的交易剩余。本文的研究结论为市场竞争和横向监督交互下的信贷契约参与人激励相容提供了行为分析基础,也为完善转轨经济环境下的投资者权益保障机制设计提供了参考。Based on the analysis of the origin of moral hazard in the credit contract and its mitigation mechanisms, this paper points outthe regulatory effect on moral hazard behavior of entrepreneurs of lateral supervision mechanism and analyzes its principle. This paper is supported by the model of three-period credit contract, aiming to study the governance effect of lateral supervision mechanism on mitigating the moral hazard in entrepreneurs＇ project choice and revenue allocation, and protecting investors＇ interest and raising investment ratio. At the same time, this study locates the model of three-period credit contract in three different markets to investigate the interaction between competition structure and lateral supervi- sion mechanism： symmetric market, buyer competing market and seller competing market. On this basis, three parallel lab experi- ments are done on LAN by the approach of comparative institution- al experiment. Then, this paper studies the governance efficiency of lateral supervision mechanism in the three credit markets and analyzes the market performance and income distribution of the three markets by comparison. The results show that： the buyer com- petition strengthens the governance effectiveness of lateral supervi- sion mechanism and the seller competition weakens the governance effectiveness of lateral supervision mechanism; the contract ratio fluctuates mostly in symmetric market and the compliance rate declines fastest in seller competitive market. Compared with the setting of symmetric market, in the credit market with buyer com- petition, the governance effects of lateral supervision mechanism is improved, and the overall revenue of market exchange is raised. However, as the buyer competition weakens the bargaining ability of entrepreneurs, most of the surpluses produced in the credit ex- change are owned by investors. Compared with the setting of sym- metric market, in the credit market with seller competition, lateral supervision mechanism is weakened, and the overall marke

关 键 词：市场竞争 横向监督机制 信贷契约治理效率 比较制度实验 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]