基于市场化运营导向的铁路运输清算激励机制研究  

A Study of Railway Liquidation Incentive Mechanism Based on Market Operation

作　　者：高小珣[1] 魏然[1] 花伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国铁道科学研究院运输及经济研究所,北京100081

出　　处：《北京交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第1期38-43,共6页Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：铁道部重点研究项目(2012X006-A)阶段性成果

摘　　要：依据现行铁路运输清算办法,对京哈、京沪等重点线路客货运输清算收入的实例分析发现,铁路局开行客货列车的意愿与全路收益最大化目标不一致。直通客货运输、管内与直通运输、清算收入与成本支出之间存在一定程度的激励机制缺失,不利于铁路运输企业的市场化运营。建议从清算类别、清算标准以及清算机制等方面完善现有清算体系,建立符合全路收益最大化和运力资源集约化利用的铁路运输经济激励机制。By analyzing the liquidation income of passenger and freight transportation of main rail- ways such as the Beijing-Harbin and Beijing-Shanghai railways with the existing liquidation method, it is revealed that there is a big discrepancy between the profitable will of transportation and the goal of maximization of the overall revenue. There is a lack of incentives to a certain de- gree in areas of through-passenger-and-freight transportation, local and through-traffic, clearing revenue and operation cost, which is disadvantageous to the marketization of railway transporta- tion. It is proposed that the existing liquidation system in such aspects as liquidation classifica- tion, criterion, and mechanisms be bettered so as to establish an incentive system to achieve the revenue maximization and the intensive use of transport resources in China＇s railway economics.

关 键 词：铁路清算办法 经济激励 市场化运营 

分 类 号：F53[经济管理—产业经济]