博弈论视角下的科技型中小企业关系型融资分析及实证研究  

Empirical Study of the Relationship Financing by High-Tech SMEs Based on the Game Theory

作　　者：潘永明[1] 张婷婷[1] 李雪[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第1期13-18,共6页Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目:"中小企业团体融资路径与机制研究"(11BGL023);天津市政府决策咨询重点课题项目:"科技型中小企业团体融资实施方案研究"(ZFZX2012-10)

摘　　要：关系型融资能够有效地缓解银行与中小企业之间的信息不对称,消除逆向选择。基于科技型中小企业的融资特点,运用信号博弈和实证方法对科技型企业的关系型融资问题进行研究。研究表明:不断地向银行传递信号,有助于提高科技型中小企业的融资能力;成功信号能够强化其为强类型的概率,失败信号会弱化概率;银行和企业的关系年限越长、科技型企业专利数量越多,享受的利率优惠越多,企业的国有性质及银行的规模对利率优惠的影响最为显著。Relationship financing can effectively alleviate the information asymmetry between banks and high- tech SMEs, eliminating the adverse selection. This paper studied the relationship financing of high-tech SMEs with signaling game theory and empirical method based on financing characteristics of the high-tech SMEs. The data analysis of high-tech zones in Tianjin showed that continuous signal transmission to the bank helped high- tech SMEs improve the financing ability. Successful signals would strengthen the strongly-typed probability while failed signals would weaken the probability. The high-tech SMEs of more patents and closer relationship with banks would enjoy more interest rates privilege. In addition, the state-owned nature of enterprises and the size of banks had a significant effect on interest rates privilege.

关 键 词：关系型融资 科技型中小企业 信号传递博弈 回归分析 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]