不对称信息下逆向供应链奖惩机制研究  

Study on the premium and penalty mechanism of reverse supply chain under asymmetric information

作　　者：王文宾[1] 陈祥东[1] 周敏[1] 聂锐[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《中国矿业大学学报》2014年第1期175-182,共8页Journal of China University of Mining & Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71102164);国家自然科学基金面上项目(70971022);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630249);中国博士后科学基金项目(20110491478);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2013W02);江苏省博士后基金项目(1002073C)

摘　　要：考虑废旧电器电子产品回收再制造在环境保护和资源循环利用中的重要性,分析了第三方回收商负责废旧电器电子产品回收的逆向供应链中回收商的固定成本信息不对称问题;根据委托代理理论,运用信息甄别契约,研究了无奖惩机制和政府对回收商实施奖惩机制的两个模型.结果表明:政府对回收商实施奖惩机制后回收率和回收商的利润都随奖惩力度的增大而增加,均比无奖惩机制时高;在政府奖惩机制的作用下,固定成本高的回收商比固定成本低的回收商的回收率增加幅度大;若奖惩力度较小,制造商的回购价会提高,若奖惩力度较大,制造商的回购价会降低;回收率的提高表明了不对称信息下政府奖惩机制引导废旧产品回收的有效性.Considering the importance of waste electrical and electronic product recycling and remanufacturing in environmental protection and resource recycling, the problem that recyclers fixed cost is .asymmetric information is discussed in reverse supply chain, in which the third- party recycler is responsible for the recycling of waste electric and electronic products. Accord- ing to the principal-agent theory and information screening contract, we studied two models： without premium and penalty mechanism and with government＇s premium and penalty mecha- nism for the recyclers. The results show that： under government＇s premium and penalty mech- anism, the return rate and recycler＇s profit increase with the increasing degree of premium and penalty, which are higher than that without premium and penalty mechanism; with govern- ment＇s premium and penalty mechanism the increasing range of return rate for the recycler of high fixed cost is higher than that for the recycler of low fixed cost. If the degree of premium and penalty is little, the manufacturer will raise the repurchase price, and if the degree of pre- mium and penalty is forceful enough, the manufacturer will lower the repurchase price. The in- crease of return rate shows that the government＇s premium and penalty mechanism is effective to guide the recycling of waste products under asymmetric information.

关 键 词：奖惩机制 逆向供应链 委托代理 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]