买方抗衡势力与制造商定价决策  

The Pricing Decisions of Supplier When Retailer Has Countervailing Power

作　　者：李凯[1] 李伟[1] 崔哲[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《产经评论》2014年第1期72-86,共15页Industrial Economic Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"消费者偏好背景下买方抗衡势力形成机理及其影响研究"(项目编号:71172150;主持人:李凯);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"基于纵向关系理论的供应链利益协调机制研究"(项目编号:10YJC790004;主持人:安岗)

摘　　要：本文研究了买方抗衡势力的存在对上游制造商定价决策的影响,讨论了制造商在不同定价形式(线性定价、两部收费制和转售价格维持(RPM))之间的选择问题,并构建了两阶段动态博弈模型,引入买方抗衡势力,比较分析了制造商在零售商具有和不具有买方抗衡势力两种情况下,制造商最优定价形式的选择。研究发现当零售商不具有买方抗衡势力时,制造商选择两部收费制和RPM是无差异的,都能使上游制造商获得相等的最优利润;当零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,对于上游制造商来说两部收费制优于RPM,RPM又优于线性定价。此外,本文还发现存在一个由抗衡势力和零售商替代程度决定的临界条件,当满足这一条件时,两部收费制是上游的最优选择;一旦这一条件不满足时,RPM就成了上游的最优选择。This paper studies the impact of countervailing power on pricing decisions of the upstream supplier. More specifically, the choices of the supplier among different pricing--linear pricing, two - part tariff and the resale price maintenance （RPM） --were discussed in two situations where the retailer has countervai- ling and doesn＇t have countervailing power, respectively. Building a two -stage dynamic game model and introducing the countervailing power into the model, we show that two - part tariff and RPM are equivalent, that is to say both of them can produce the ＂ first best＂ profits for the supplier, when the retailers don＇t have coun- tervailing power. However, when a single retailer has countervailing power, two -part tariff is superior to RPM, and RPM is superior to linear pricing, that is to say only two - part tariff can produce the ＂first best＂ profit for the supplier. Also, we found that there is a prerequisite consisted by the countervailing power and the degree of substitutability for the use of two - part traffic. When the prerequisite was met, two - part tariff is the optimal choice of the supplier; however, once the prerequisite didn＇t be met, RPM became the sub - optimal choice of the supplier.

关 键 词：抗衡势力 线性定价 两部收费制 RPM 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]