共同代理框架下转售价格控制的反垄断竞争效应研究  

Research of Resale Price Maintenance's Anti-competition Effects

作　　者：高洁[1] 应珊珊 冷帅[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院

出　　处：《产经评论》2014年第1期96-103,共8页Industrial Economic Review

基　　金：上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2011-347)

摘　　要：转售价格控制一直是备受争议的纵向约束手段,也是反垄断部门重点关注的对象。本文以茅台和五粮液被处罚为出发点,研究在共同代理框架下上游制造商对产品进行广告宣传和推广等活动中采用转售价格控制是否具有反竞争效应的问题。结果表明:如果拥有全部的讨价还价能力,制造商在共同代理框架下没有动机使用转售价格控制;此外,两部定价可以使制造商达到默契合谋的结果,而与是否采用转售价格控制无关。尽管如此,转售价格控制的使用应该被反垄断部门予以禁止。The impact of RPM has been actively debated by academics, based on the case of Maotai and Wuliangye that suffer large fines, we analysis the role and the evidence of RPM that forming the market monopoly. The results show that in the common agent structure, if the manufacture has the whole bargaining power, when the manufacture provides the effort that increases demand, if manufactures use linear contract then they have no incentive to use RPM. Besides, two part tariff contract will lead to the tacit collusion which is irrelevant to RPM. Then, combined with the research before, if manufactures have the whole bargaining power RPM should be prohibited whenever the downstream compete or not.

关 键 词：转售价格控制 合谋 反垄断 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]