反垄断调查的一个鉴别:一致性定价行为背后的差异与合谋  

A Guideline for Antitrust Investigation: Collusion and Difference Behind Concerted Pricing Behavior

作　　者：徐骏[1,2] 张耀辉[3,1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院 [2]浙江财经大学政府管制研究院 [3]暨南大学管理学院党委

出　　处：《产经评论》2014年第1期104-116,共13页Industrial Economic Review

基　　金：国家社会基金重大项目"应对国际资源环境变化挑战与加快我国经济发展方式转变研究"(项目编号:09&ZD021;主持人:张耀辉)

摘　　要：如何区分成本上涨时企业同时涨价的行为究竟是价格合谋还是寡头竞争的企业正常的价格调整行为?这是反垄断执法机构面临的一个难题。本文通过数理模型证明了无论企业进行伯川德竞争还是古诺竞争,寡头竞争的企业的定价随着成本的变化存在一个连续调整路径,而组成卡特尔的企业的定价则会随着成本的变化出现一个不连续的跳跃。因此反垄断执法机构在观察到企业的一致性定价行为之后,如果能从以往的价格监测纪录中发现这些企业在成本下跌时,价格存在着更大幅度的下调,则可以据此怀疑这些企业存在着价格合谋,应开展更深入的调查来搜集这些企业违反《反垄断法》的全面证据。How to distinguish the collusive pricing from ordinary price adjustment by perfectly competitive firms when common marginal cost is rising？ This is a challenging problem often encountered by antitrust agency. This paper proves that whenever firms engage in Bertrand or Couruot competition, the pricing of perfect competitive firms obeys a continuously adjusting path with the variation of publicly observed marginal cost. In the contrast, there is a significant jump in the price range of cartel firms. Therefore, when antitrust agency observes the concerted pricing action of some firms, if these firms are found from historical price monitoring record that they have cut their price much more significant when marginal cost is low, such record can indicate their suspected collusion. Further investigation should be taken to find comprehensive evidence of undertaking that violates the antitrust law.

关 键 词：默契合谋 成本波动 反垄断 

分 类 号：F213.3[经济管理—国民经济]