基于公立医院公益性回归的政府财政补偿博弈分析  

Game analysis of governmental financial compensation based on the public welfare of state-owned hospitals

作　　者：虞兰香[1,2] 李嗣敏 张文斌[2] 王景洁 

机构地区：[1]湖北武汉市第五医院,湖北武汉430050 [2]华中科技大学同济医学院医药卫生管理学院

出　　处：《中国卫生事业管理》2014年第2期84-85,共2页Chinese Health Service Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"我国公立医院公益性财政补偿及核算体系框架研究"(编号:71073063)

摘　　要：针对目前我国公立医院公益性淡化和老百姓"看病难、看病贵"的现象,通过建立政府财政补偿与公立医院回归公益性的博弈模型,探讨公立医院公益性的回归与政府补偿的关系,提出了既要维护公立医院公益性,同时兼顾医院效率的几点建议。According to the problem of decline of public welfare in state-owned hospitals and inaccessibility and costliness in healthcare, the game model of governmental financial compensation with public welfare of state-owned hospitals was developed, by which the relationship between public welfare of state-owned hospitals and the government compensation was explored. Based on which, some suggestions were put forward to maintain the public welfare of state-owned hospitals combining with hospitals＇ effi- ciency.

关 键 词：公立医院 公益性 补偿 效率 博弈 

分 类 号：R197.3[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]