奖惩机制下的闭环供应链混合回收模式  

Hybrid recycling modes for closed-loop supply chain under premium and penalty mechanism

作　　者：易余胤[1] 梁家密[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2014年第1期215-223,共9页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901033);教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(09YJC630102);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(12JNQM002)~~

摘　　要：为了研究混合回收渠道情形下政府奖惩对闭环供应链节点企业最优定价和渠道选择的影响,利用博弈论构建了三个奖惩机制下具有混合回收的再制造闭环供应链模型,对比分析了不同混合回收模式下的回收率、零售价、节点企业和供应链的利润,从环保、消费者、节点企业和供应链等不同角度研究了最优混合回收模式的选择问题。采用算例分析的方法验证了所得结论,并分析了奖惩力度的变化对节点企业决策和利润的影响。To research the influence of government premium and penalty mechanism on optimal pricing and channel selection of closedloop supply chain node enterprises, three hybrid recycling models of product remanufacturing close＆loop supply chain were constructed by using game theory under the premium and penalty mechanism. In dif ferent hybrid recycling modes, the profits of return rate, retail price, node enterprises and supply chain were com pared and analyzed, and the selection problem of optimal hybrid recycling mode was researched from aspects of envi ronment, customer, node enterprises and supply chain. By using numerical analysis method, the proposed method was verified, and the impact of the premium and penalty on decisions and profit of enterprises was analyzed.

关 键 词：奖惩机制 闭环供应链 混合回收 博弈论 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]