基于信任商品视角的新农合制度下供方诱导需求研究  

Study on Supplier-induced Demand in Context of New Rural Cooperative Medical System from the Perspective of Credence Goods

作　　者：颜涛[1] 郭军灵[1] 向毅 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学工商管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]仙桃市第三中学,湖北仙桃433000

出　　处：《山西科技》2014年第1期38-41,44,共5页Shanxi Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目(10YJC790325);浙江省自然科学基金项目(Y7100002)

摘　　要：从信任商品的角度出发,建立了一个信号博弈模型分析新农合制度下医疗机构与农民患者之间的医患博弈,以揭示供方诱导需求的内在机理。结论表明,医生是否会对农民患者进行欺骗取决于诸多因素的影响,不同的区域、不同的疾病以及同样疾病条件下各医疗机构的医疗技术水平所导致的医疗成本的不同,医生的行为也随之不同。因此,建议监管机构抑制供方诱导需求,以遏制农民医疗费用的迅速上涨,促进新农合制度的稳定运行。From the viewpoint of credence goods, this paper builds a signaling game model to study the doctor-patient game between medical institutions and farmer patients in context of the new rural cooperative medical system in China for revealing the internal mechanism of supplier-induced demand. The conclusion shows that whether the doctors would cheat the farmer patients depends on the influence of many factors, the different regions, different diseases, and the different medical costs caused by the medical technology levels of different medical institutions under the same disease condition, doctors＇ behaviors are different. So, suggesting that the supervision organizations should control the supplier-induced demand to restraint the quick increase of farmers＇ medical cost and promote the smooth operation of the new rural cooperative medical system.

关 键 词：供方诱导需求 信任商品 新农合制度 信号博弈 

分 类 号：R197.1[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]