府际关系背景的利益协调与均衡:观察京津冀  

Interest Coordination and Equilibrium under the Background of Intergovernmental Relationship:the Observation of Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei Region

作　　者：齐子翔[1] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学城市经济与公共管理学院,北京100070

出　　处：《改革》2014年第2期79-89,共11页Reform

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"产业转移与我国区域空间结构优化研究"(批准号:10zd&022);国家自然科学基金项目"中国经济密度空间格局与演化机制研究"(批准号:41071076)

摘　　要：以京津冀省际经济利益为例,选择省际纳什均衡作为协调路径,以空间计量为手段,以合同契约为形式设计省际经济利益协调机制。中央政府应创新出更加有效率的地方政府考核机制与权威仲裁机构,形成改革的内生动力和协调前提,重构不同区域在经济方面发生交换的激励结构,降低省际经济利益协调费用,从而促进区域经济增长。By taking Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei region as example, and making inter-provincial Nash equilibrium as coordination path, quantitative analysis as tools and covenants as form, we design a coordination mechanism for inter-provincial economic interest. The central government should innovate more efficient performance evaluation mechanism for local governments and authoritative arbitrage mechanism, form the endogenous power and coordination precondition of reform, reconstruct the incentive mechanisms which different regions will exchange from the economic perspective, and reduce the coordination cost for inter-provincial economic interest, which is good for regional economic growth.

关 键 词：京津冀经济发展 府际经济利益 府际协调机制 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济]