财政集权、政府控制与企业税负——来自中国的证据  

Fiscal Centralization,Government Control and Corporate Tax Burden——Evidence from China

作　　者：刘骏[1,2,3] 刘峰[1,2,3] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,510275 [2]厦门大学管理学院,361005 [3]中山大学现代会计与财务研究中心,510275

出　　处：《会计研究》2014年第1期21-27,94,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272079);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(11JJD790032)支持

摘　　要：本文检验了政府控制与企业税负的关系。由于流转税实际上构成了我国企业税负的主要部分,我们建立了一个新的企业税负衡量指标,将企业流转税税负纳入考虑范围。我们发现国企税负低于非国企。国企中,地方国企税负高于央企,并且地方政府层级越低,其控制的企业税负越高。我们认为,这与我国目前高度集权的财政体制下地方政府的"税收竞争"和"税收攫取"行为有关。我们还发现,本文结果源自企业在税收返还和增值税税负上的差异。This paper examines the relationship between government control and the tax burden of firms in China. We develop a new corporate tax burden measurement taking turnover taxes into account,because in China turnover taxes actually constitute the main component of tax burden. We find that the tax burden of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) is lower than non-SOEs,indicating that non-SOEsare facing tax discrimination. Among SOEs,the tax burden of local SOEs is higher than that of central SOEs,and the lower the local governments' level,the higher the tax burden of SOEs under their control. We interpret these findings as the result of local governments' tax competition and tax grabbing behaviors under China' s current highly centralized fiscal system. In addition,we find that our results are mainly caused by firms' differences in tax refunds and the Value-Added Tax(VAT) burden.

关 键 词：财政集权 政府控制 流转税税负 企业税负 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学] F275F224