传统农村民间借贷的运行机制研究——基于村庄治理视角  

On Mechanism of Traditional Rural Private Lending in Perspective of Village Governance Theory

作　　者：赵丙奇[1] 朱彩云[1] 

机构地区：[1]宁波大学商学院,浙江宁波315211

出　　处：《宁波大学学报（人文科学版）》2014年第2期86-90,共5页Journal of Ningbo University：Liberal Arts Edition

基　　金：国家自然基金项目(71273143);浙江省社科规划之江青年课题(13ZJQN015YB);浙江省软科学项目(2012C35070)

摘　　要：通过建立完全信息无限次重复博弈民间借贷模型,基于村庄治理理论,研究了传统农村民间借贷稳定运行的内在原因,认为正是村庄治理的两大作用:信息形成和违约惩罚,抑制了传统农村民间借贷风险,维持并促进民间借贷的稳定发展。因此,认为基于血缘、地缘关系的传统农村民间借贷是一种非常稳定的借贷形式。Based on the village governance theory and a model of private lending established on infinitely repeated games under complete information environment, this article makes a study of the internal causes of the stable operation of traditional private lending in rural areas. It holds that it is the two functions of village governance, information formation and default punishment, that inhibit the risk, maintain and promote the stable development of the private lending. It argues that the traditional rural private lending based on kinship and geographical relation is very stable.

关 键 词：信息形成 违约惩罚 村庄治理 民间借贷 

分 类 号：F832.35[经济管理—金融学]