基于产能投资的上下游企业联盟机制  

Revenue-Sharing Contract Design in a Supply Chain Based on Capacity Investments

作　　者：朱晨卉 董明[2] 刘少轩[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学中美物流研究院,上海200030 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2014年第2期312-316,共5页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：上海市曙光人才计划资助项目(09SG17);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71131005;71102141);上海交通大学文理交叉重点项目(11JCZ02)

摘　　要：研究了确定型需求条件下单一供应商和2个制造商组成的二级供应链,其中下游的一个制造商为供应商提供产能投资,并参与供应商利润分成.研究了不同决策方式下多阶段博弈的最优决策,通过数值分析讨论了需求弹性系数和融资成本系数对于联盟决策以及各方的收益的影响,具有一定的实际参考价值.Companies often face significant technical and financial risks when building new factories to ex- pand capacity. Coordination of supply chain members in capacity investments can reduce risk. This paper considered a supply chain which consisted of one supplier and two manufacturers. One of the manufacturers provided capacity investment for the upstream supplier. In return, the supplier shared some portion of its revenue with the manufacturer. This paper studied the optimal contract designs under different modes of collaboration between the manufacturer and the supplier. It analyzed the effect of optimal contracts on optimal decisions of supply chain members and on their respective profits. It obtained several insights through numerical simulations which were useful in actual negotiation.

关 键 词：产能投资 利润分成 供应链契约 供应链合作 

分 类 号：F253.3[经济管理—国民经济]