指示条件句的真值条件、相信条件与接受条件  

Indicative Conditionals;Truth Conditions,Belief Conditions,and Acceptance Conditions

作　　者：苏庆辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学哲学与社会发展学院

出　　处：《世界哲学》2014年第2期146-158,161,共13页World Philosophy

基　　金："山东大学自主创新基金"(人文社科青年团队项目:意图与行动的哲学研究)资助

摘　　要：针对涉及指示条件句的语言现象,许多学者认为真值函数语意论无法提供一个让人满意的解释,故转而求助于斯托内克的语意论或概率语意论。在许多文章里,埃金顿批评了对条件句采取真值条件式的语意论(包含真值函数语意论与斯托内克的语意论),并主张概率语意论是唯一可信的条件句语意论。在2008年的文章里,布洛克为斯托内克的语意论作辩护,并宣称埃金顿的真正贡献在于指出条件句一个被人忽略的特征,亦即在考虑条件句时,接受/蕴含原则会失效。本文旨在提出两个论点:(一)在我们适当地区分真值条件、相信条件与接受条件后,真值函数语意论并不如许多学者想的那样差;(二)布洛克对斯托内克语意论的辩护有特设之嫌,除非她能够进一步说明为什么在考虑条件句时,接受/蕴含原则会失效。Many philosophers and logicians believe that truth-functional semantics fails to offer a satisfactory explanation for most linguistic phenomena concerning indicative conditionals so that most of them turn to Stalnaker's possible-worlds semantics or probabilistic semantics.Moreover,in many places Edgington argued that truth-conditional semantics of conditionals(including both truth-functional and Stalnaker's semantics) is doomed to failure,and thus probabilistic semantics is the best theory in the market.In her2008 paper,Block stood for Stalnaker's semantics by arguing that Edgington's criticism is due to an improper conflation of truth conditions and acceptance conditions,and claimed there that ' the real contribution of Edgington's argument lies in bringing to light a characteristic that conditionals must have if they do express propositions'.Two theses will be argued in this paper:first,if three different concepts,namely truth conditions,belief conditions,and acceptance conditions,are properly distinguished,truthfunctional semantics is not as bad as people conceived;second,while Block claimed that Acceptance/Entailment principle will fail when considering ' if',her claim is ad hoc unless she can explain further why the principle will fail.

关 键 词：指示条件句 斯托内克的语意论 真值函数语意论 埃金顿 布洛克 

分 类 号：B81-053[哲学宗教—逻辑学]