债权治理对盈余质量的影响研究  

Research on the Influence of Debt Governance of Earnings Quality

作　　者：薛小荣[1] 唐凯桃[2] 赵琳[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安财经学院商学院,陕西西安710100 [2]西华师范大学商学院,四川南充637002

出　　处：《统计与信息论坛》2014年第2期58-62,共5页Journal of Statistics and Information

基　　金：陕西省高校教改项目<产学研协同培养区域财经应用型创新人才机制研究与实践>(13BY70)

摘　　要：企业盈余信息的质量受公司治理程度影响较大,债权治理则是公司治理中的一个重要组成部分。以债权治理的信号传递效应和积极监督效应为基础,分析债权治理对盈余质量的影响;利用修正的琼斯模型对盈余质量进行计量,以上市公司的资本结构衡量债权治理的效果,据此来研究两者之间的关系;研究表明:债务融资会促使管理层对上市公司盈余的操纵,即债务融资的增加反而降低了上市公司的盈余质量。Abstract. The quality of corporate earnings information is irfluenced by the degree ot corporate governance, debt management is an important part of corporate governance. This paper analyzed the claims management on the quality of earnings based on signaling effect and positive supervision effect and used the modified Jones model to measure earnings quality. At last, it studied the relationship between earnings quality and claims management. Research shows that, debt financing will lead the managers of listed companies to manipulate earnings, namely increasing the debt financing will lead lower earnings quality.

关 键 词：债权治理 盈余质量 修正的琼斯模型 

分 类 号：F224.0[经济管理—国民经济]