新能源产业价格补贴该由谁来买单  

Who Will Pay the Price Subsidies to the New Energy Industry

作　　者：孙鹏[1] 张力[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院,广东广州510632 [2]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广东广州510642

出　　处：《财经论丛》2014年第2期90-96,F0003,共8页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71271100);广东省高等学校珠江学者岗位计划资助项目(2012)

摘　　要：本文通过能源生产与消费的四阶段博弈模型,比较分析了新能源价格补贴三种不同分摊方式下最优价格与社会福利差异。结果表明:价格方面,市场规模较低时,消费方分摊方式的补贴价格最高,传统能源企业分摊方式最低。社会福利方面,电力市场规模、新能源企业成本系数与污染物损害程度越大,传统能源企业分摊方式下的社会福利越大。因此,未来我国新能源价格补贴应由消费者分摊方式逐步向传统能源企业分摊方式转变。By establishing a four-stage game model of energy production and consumption, we make a comparative analy- sis of optimal subsidy price and social welfare in three different allocation modes of price subsidy. The results show that ： when the market size is small, the consumer allocation mode yields the highest subsidy price while the traditional energy enterprise allocation mode produces the lowest subsidy price. In social welfare, the bigger are the power market scale, new energy enter- prise cost coefficient and pollution damage, the greater the social welfare is in the traditional energy enterprise allocation mode. Therefore, China should gradually achieve transition from the consumer allocation mode to traditional energy enterprise allocation mode.

关 键 词：新能源 传统能源 价格补贴 分摊方式 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]