激励理论在财政监督中的应用研究  

The Application of Incentive Theory in Fiscal Supervision

作　　者：彭锻炼[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院财税学院,上海201620

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2013年第6期89-94,共6页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：上海市教育委员会科研创新项目(09YS437)

摘　　要：在实践中,存在使用财政资金的公共部门之间进行串谋的可能,通过互投赞成票、互惠行为等方式获取预算编制和预算执行中的信息租金,降低财政资金使用效率。因此,可以应用激励理论进行监督机制的设计,实现部门之间的相互制约与平衡,达到提高财政资金使用效率的目的。借鉴"制约与平衡"模型,分析应用激励理论提高财政监督效率的理论,主要包括基本模型和最优对称机制等方面,然后根据理论模型的结论分析其现实启示意义。In practice,a conspiracy happens between public sectors financed by fiscal resources. Information rent in budget preparation and execution is got through logrolling or reciprocal behavior,and the efficiency of financial capital is reduced as a result.This paper applies the incentive theory into the design of oversight mechanism to achieve mutual constraint and balance between public sectors,and to improve the efficiency of fiscal funds.In the paper,the application of the incentive theory to improve the efficiency of fiscal funds is theoretically discussed based on the model of checks and balances,including the basic model and the optimal symmetry mechanism,and the reality enlightenment is pointed out based on the conclusions of the theoretical model.

关 键 词：激励理论 最优对称机制 财政监督 

分 类 号：F810.2[经济管理—财政学]