反倾销威慑、研发合作与企业的研发投入  

Antidumping Deterrence,R&D Cooperation and R&D Expenditure of Firms

作　　者：张国旺[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院亚太与全球战略研究院

出　　处：《世界经济研究》2014年第3期3-8,87,共6页World Economy Studies

摘　　要：借助异质产品的Bertrand双寡头模型,在两国企业进行研发合作的条件下,本文分析了一国反倾销政策对该国企业和外国企业研发投入的影响。研究结论表明:与自由贸易相比,当产品的差异度较小时,受反倾销政策保护的本国企业会策略性地利用反倾销威慑而退出国外市场,这将使得外国企业垄断外国市场,提高外国企业研发投入的边际收益,进而诱使外国企业增加研发投入,而这也将提高本国企业研发投入的边际收益,不过由于本国企业退出外国市场会降低其研发投入的边际收益,因此本国企业研发投入的相对多少取决于这两种效应的相对大小。本文的研究对于重新认识反倾销的经济效应具有重要意义。The paper analyses the impact of antidumping policies on home firm and foreign firm's R&D and the price in a Bertrand duopoly model on differentiated goods under coopration on R&D.In contrast with free trade,it is shown that an antidumping policy can be strategically exploited by the home firm to withdraw from the foreign market when the differentiated degree of goods is smaller.While the home firm withdraw from the foreign market,the foreign market will be monopolied by the foreign firm,then the marginal revenue of foreign firm's expenditure rises.As the relationship of firm's R&D is strategic complement,the home firm's marginal revenue of the R&D expenditure and R&D expenditure will also rise following the foreign firm' s R&D expenditure raised.However,it will reduce the home firm's marginal revenue on R&D expenditure when the home firm withdraw from the foreign market.How much will be the home firm's R&D expenditure against free trade case depends on the two effects relatively.The result is of significance to reknow the economic effect of antidumping policies.

关 键 词：反倾销威慑 研发合作 研发投入 

分 类 号：F752.02[经济管理—国际贸易] F273.1[经济管理—产业经济] F224