博弈视角的联保贷款难:模型表达与脱困之路  

The Difficult of Group Lending Based on Game Theory:The Model Representation and Turnaround of the Road

作　　者：李开伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北师范大学经济学院,甘肃兰州730070

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2014年第2期20-25,共6页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70963011)

摘　　要：文章讨论如何设置银行的惩罚力度将银行与借款人、借款人与借款人之间的博弈整合为联保贷款小组成员之间的博弈,并分析了个体加入联保贷款小组及其偿还贷款影响因素。研究发现:申请联保贷款的借款人会选择与风险型相同的借款人一组;针对不同联保贷款小组应计算其合适的贷款利率,不应采用一刀切的贷款利率;银行设置的惩罚力度达到一定程度时能消除借款人的主观违约意愿。This paper analyzes how banks could set up the bank’s punishment to transform the traditional loan-repayment games between banks and the borrower into games between the borrower and the borrow-er ,show s the individual joins its team of group lending and factors affecting the loan repayment .Study found that ：borrowers applying for group lending would group with a same risk type borrower ;group lending for different teams should calculate the appropriate lending rates ,lending rates should not be used across the board ;the degree of punishment to a certain extent can eliminate borrower’s subjective defaul-ting w illing ness .

关 键 词：联保贷款 借款人违约 银行的惩罚力度 

分 类 号：F830.58[经济管理—金融学]