基于环境审计的节能减排规制模型  

Environmental Audit-Based Model on the Regulation of the Energy Saving and Emission Reduction

作　　者：黄溶冰[1] 李玉辉[2] 陈耿[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计学院国际审计学院,江苏南京210029 [2]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2014年第1期249-255,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目<我国节能减排的环境审计规制研究(11BGL062)>;国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271117);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(10YJC790098);江苏省高校自然科学研究重大项目(11KJA630001)

摘　　要：为考察环境审计在节能减排中的规制效果,本文设计了两个参与人三种情境下的博弈模型,(1)监管者介入公司环境审计报告、无条件处罚,(2)监管者不介入公司环境审计报告、无条件处罚,(3)监管者介入公司环境审计报告,有条件处罚。研究结果表明,审计报告的介入权为公司开展环境审计提供了正向激励;公司因努力改善环境而减轻处罚的有条件处罚机制增加了公司环境审计的倾向性。本文的研究发现为环境审计制度设计提供了理论基础。In order to inspect the environmental audit＇ s regulation effect on the energy saving and emission reduction, the paper designs the two-person game models under three situations ： （ 1 ） the supervisor gets involved in the company＇ s environmental audit report, unconditional punishment. （2） the supervisor doesn＇ t get involved in the company＇ s environmental audit report, unconditional punishment. （3）the supervisor gets involved in the company＇ s environmental audit report, conditional punishment. The study results show that the intervention right of the audit report provides the company with positive incentive to carry out the environmental audit. The condi- tional punishment mechanism, that is, the company＇ s efforts to improve the environment can reduce the punish- ment and increase the tendentiousness of the company＇ s environmental audit. The findings of the paper provide the environmental audit system with the theoretical foundation.

关 键 词：节能减排 环境审计 博弈模型 介入权 有条件处罚 

分 类 号：C931.1[经济管理—管理学] F239.4