再论卡尔沃主义的复活——投资者—国家争端解决视角  

Revisiting the Revival of Calvo Doctrine: From the Perspective of Dispute Settlement between Investor and State

作　　者：韩秀丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学法学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《现代法学》2014年第1期121-135,共15页Modern Law Science

基　　金：教育部2011年度"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(NCET-11-0292)

摘　　要：晚近,一些国家为应对国际投资仲裁程序,修改宪法、法律和合同,限制或放弃国际投资协定中的投资者—国家争端解决条款,甚至终止双边投资条约和退出《解决国家与他国国民间投资争端公约》,这一系列现象是卡尔沃主义不同程度复活的表现。卡尔沃主义复活的原因在于经济危机引发的对新自由主义的质疑、解决投资争端国际中心为代表的国际投资仲裁制度本身的缺陷,以及各国对保留规制权的诉求。在这种国际潮流和背景下,中国应支持和提倡改革现行国际投资仲裁体制,在签订国际投资协定时,应审慎设计投资者—国家争端解决条款。In recent years, a number of countries amended their constitutions, legislations or contracts to restrict or delete the dispute settlement provisions between investor and state in their international investment a- greements, and some even phased out bilateral investment treaties and denounced the ICSID Convention in or- der to evade international investment arbitration proceeding. These series of phenomena are manifestations of the revival of Calvo doctrine to varying degrees. The fundamental reasons for the revival of Calvo doctrine lie in the challenges to Neo-liberalism raised by the occurrence of economic crisis, the inherent defects of internation- al investment arbitration system represented by ICSID, and the urge to preserve states＇ regulatory competence. Under these circumstances, China should support and advocate reforming existing international investment arbi- tration system. And when signing any international investment agreements, China should design the dispute set- tlement provisions between investor and state prudently.

关 键 词：卡尔沃主义 投资者—国家争端解决条款 新自由主义 规制权 

分 类 号：DF964[政治法律—国际法学]