农户信用信息共享实现条件的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on the Realization Conditions of Farmer Credit Information Sharing

作　　者：张晓蕾[1] 牛霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《征信》2014年第2期46-50,共5页Credit Reference

基　　金：中国农业大学本科生科研训练计划(21081108)

摘　　要：运用博弈分析和相应机制设计的方法,建立"无偿、开放""无偿、封闭""有偿、开放""有偿、封闭"不完全信息静态博弈模型,对四种信用信息共享模式下农户自发共享其信用信息的实现条件进行分析,以期实现农户信用信息共享的博弈均衡。在此基础上,针对我国农户信用信息共享模式现阶段存在的问题,提出相关建议:注重农户信用信息产品定价,促进市场化发展;创造良好外部环境,降低参与主体的共享成本,提高共享收益。By using game analysis and corresponding mechanism design, an incomplete information static game model is established, i.e. ＂free, open free, closed paid, open paid, closed＂. An analysis is made on the realization conditions for farmers spontaneously sharing of credit information under four credit information sharing models so as to realize game equilibrium of farmer credit information sharing. On this basis, in view of the existing problems for farmers on credit information sharing model, the following suggestions are made ： focus on farmers cred- it information product pricing, promote market-oriented development; create a favorable external environment, re- duce the costs of participators sharing, and improve revenue sharing

关 键 词：农村征信 信用信息共享 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F832.29[经济管理—金融学]