京津冀大气污染治理省际合作博弈模型  

Inter-provincial cooperative game model of Beijing,Tianjin and Hebei province air pollution control

作　　者：薛俭[1,2] 谢婉林 李常敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200444 [2]中国邮政集团公司培训中心,石家庄050021

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2014年第3期810-816,共7页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71373155);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-10-0938);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(13YJC630196)

摘　　要：首先,结合目前京津冀区域大气污染的实际情况,提出了通过省际合作达到大气污染治理的3个基本假设.其次,通过构建区域优化模型和Shapley值合作收益分配方案,建立了京津冀大气污染治理省际合作博弈模型.通过求解区域优化模型得到各省份最优去除量和去除成本,进而利用Shapley值法获得相对公平的合作收益分配方案.最后,以2009年京津冀各省份SO_2去除为例进行了实证分析,结果显示了京津冀省际合作博弈模型的有效性和实用性,而且模型最优化模拟结果可作为区域决策的重要参考,促使各省份合作共赢.Firstly, based on the status quo of air pollution in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei province, the paper summarized three basic assumptions on inter-provincial cooperative air pollution control. Secondly, the paper constructed inter-provincial cooperative air pollution control game model which included the regional optimization model and the Shapley value allocation method. By solving the regional optimization model, the paper obtained the optimal reduction and reduction cost for each province. Then applying the Shapley value allocation method, the paper achieved the relatively fair distribution of the cooperation benefit among Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei province. Finally, the paper used the SO2 reduction of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei province in 2009 as an example to carry out the empirical analysis. The results demonstrated the effectiveness and practicability of the model, and optimized simulation results of the model can be used as a reference for regional decision-making, such a win-win model will enhance regional cooperation in air pollution control.

关 键 词：大气污染 泡泡政策 合作博弈 Shapley值分配法 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]