利益分歧、有成本交流与内生权威  

Interest Divergence,Costly Communication and Endogenous Authority

作　　者：韩中元[1] 管毅平[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2014年第1期583-600,共18页China Economic Quarterly

摘　　要：本文试图为内生权威问题提供一个可资参考的初步的模型,分析组织在什么条件下采用权威决策规则,在什么条件下采用多数制决策规则。我们发现:权威均衡要求群体成员间的利益分歧足够小,还要求存在一定的交流成本;同时拥有认知优势的一方获得权威。多数制均衡要求群体成员间的利益分歧足够大,交流成本较小。此外,如果权威决策规则是唯一的纳什均衡,那么它是有效率的,而多数制决策规则未必是有效率的。The paper tries to develop a preliminary model for reference for the issues of endogenous authority by analyzing the conditions for authoritative decision-making rule and majority decision-making rule, respectively within an organization. We have obtained some interesting findings： decision by authority requires small interest divergence and some com- munication cost among group members, and the party with cognitive advantageswill obtain the authority. Decision by voting demands big interest divergence and less communication- cost. If authoritative decision-making rule is the unique Nash equilibrium, it holds the effi- ciency as well. However, majority decision-making rule may not be efficient.

关 键 词：内生权威 利益分歧 有成本交流 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]