政府干预与房地产市场泡沫之间的关系分析  

On the Relation of Government Intervention and Real Estate Bubbles

作　　者：潘耘[1] 蓝海[1] 刘铁军[2] 屠梅曾[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030 [2]海通证券股份有限公司,上海200021

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2013年第6期122-127,133,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71109091)

摘　　要：构建了一个多阶段效用博弈模型,用以说明中央/地方两级政府在面对房地产市场泡沫出现的时候,如何围绕房地产业的收益和居民生活福利下降等核心指标实现均衡的过程。通过模型的演绎说明:GDP考核导向体制下,无论是中央政府还是地方政府均无动力推进房地产泡沫遏制举措的实施。相反其效用偏好反而影响市场进一步推动房地产市场泡沫。因此有必要对各级政府的考核目标做出必要的修正,以切实有效地降低房地产市场价格泡沫带来的风险。In constructing a multi-stage games model, this paper intends to illustrate the process of achieving balance between the central government and local government in dealing with the emergence of bubbles in the real estate market by looking at core indicators such as the revenue of real estate industry and the decline in residential living standard and general welfare. The model deduction shows that in a GDP performance oriented assessment system, neither the central government nor the local government is motivated to implement counter measures against real estate bubbles. On the contrary,its utility preference will influence the market in a way that further enhances the real estate market bubble. Therefore it is imperative that necessary adjustments be made in the assessment goals of various levels of government so as to effectively reduce the risks brought by price bubbles of the real estate market.

关 键 词：房地产泡沫 政府干预 关系 

分 类 号：F293.2[经济管理—国民经济]