货运联盟利益分配博弈分析  

Analysis of Cargo Alliance Benefit Distribution Game

作　　者：邢田宝 

机构地区：[1]福州大学,福建福州350116

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2014年第2期20-22,共3页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：随着我国货运业的快速发展以及国外物流巨头的进入,货运市场竞争越来越激烈。为了实现强强联合,许多货运企业开始选择组建货物运输联盟,而货物运输联盟是否能组建以及组建后能否稳定运营则是货物运输企业决策的关键,基于企业面临的这个问题,文中利用sharpley值法证明了各种类型的货物运输企业在进行联盟时的预期收益大于不联合或部分联合时的预期收益并建立利益分配的博弈分析模型,为各企业组建联盟提供分配方案谈判的理论基础。With the rapid development of freight industry in our country and foreign logistics giants to enter, freight market is more and more fierce, in order to achieve the power-and-power union, many shipping companies begin to choose to form a union of carriage of goods, and whether cargo transport union will form and form a stable operation is the key of the cargo transport business decisions, based on the enterprise facing this problem, this article USES the method of sharpley values proves that the various types of cargo transportation enterprise in the alliance＆#39;s expected return is greater than the expected return and not joint or part of a joint interest distribution of game analysis model is set up, for the enterprise to form a coalition to provide the theoretical basis of allocation negotiation.

关 键 词：货运联盟 利益分配 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F251.2[经济管理—国民经济]