基于网络外部性的港口FDI企业与内资港口企业博弈策略研究  

Game Strategy Study Between Port FDI Enterprise and Domestic Port Enterprise Based on Network Externality

作　　者：张文芬[1] 涂敏[1] 杨家其[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学交通学院,湖北武汉430063

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2014年第3期37-44,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(41101106)

摘　　要：将港口服务产品的网络外部性和服务质量水平引入到发货人的效用函数中,通过Hotelling价格竞争模型分析港口FDI企业与内资港口企业的博弈策略行为,分别研究在Nash和Stackelberg博弈条件下,港口服务价格、收益与网络外部性系数、服务质量水平之间的关系.理论研究的结论表明:港口FDI企业与内资港口企业在Stackelberg条件下的最优定价、均衡收益均大于Nash条件下的最优定价、均衡收益;企业最优定价随网络外部性强度线性递减,随服务水平线性递增;企业均衡收益受服务水平和网络外部性强度的影响,呈现出一定的区间变化规律,处于相同港口外部市场环境下,内资港口企业与港口FDI企业的服务策略选择和侧重点不相同.The service level and network externality of port are introduced into the utility function of the consignor.The paper analyzes the Game behavior between port FDI enterprise and domestic port enterprise by Hotelling price competition model.In the competition,price,income,service,and network externality are four key factors.Through the research,the relationship among the four factors will be clear in the condition of Nash and Stackelberg.The theoretical conclusions of the study show that,for both port FDI enterprise and domestic port enterprise,the optimal price and balanced revenue in the condition of Stackelberg are higher than that in the condition of Nash.Moreover,the optimal price is linear increasing with service level and linear diminishing with the strength of network externalities; the balanced revenue is influenced by service and network externalities,and the changes show a regular pattern in a certain range.In the same port market environment,for port FDI enterprise and domestic port enterprise in competition,the focus and service strategies are not the same.

关 键 词：港口 Hotelling价格竞争模型 网络外部性 服务质量水平 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F552