公共产品技术创新过程中的政府偏袒策略  

Public Discrimination Strategy in Public Goods Technological Innovation

作　　者：海江涛[1] 仲伟俊[1] 梅姝娥[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2014年第1期131-137,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071033);国家科技部创新方法专项课题资助项目(20101M040300-04)

摘　　要：政府部门通过招标采购的方式从公共科研机构或企业获取所需技术推动公共产品技术创新。以买方决定的逆向拍卖理论和寻租竞争理论为基础,分析了投标者之间信息完全与信息不完全条件下,政府部门为实现既定福利目标所确定的最优偏袒规则问题以及具体实施偏袒规则的条件。研究表明,当投标者之间信息完全时,最优偏袒规则主要由投标者获得租金的差异程度,政府部门的偏好以及产品技术优势提高对获得租金可能性的影响程度所决定;当投标者信息不完全时,最优偏袒规则应该在公平竞争与完全偏袒技术能力较高的投标商之间确定。Technological innovation of public goods is defined as the process of developing new products to meet social public needs and generating social economic benefits through the applied research,technological development,transformation and application.Few researches have studied the relationship between public goods and innovation process by considering public discrimination.We add the factor of public discrimination to public sector＇s tool box containing the possible means （control variables） to analyze the effect of political culture and valuation asymmetry on optimal discrimination rules during the process of public product technological innovation.Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given rent.For instance,governments procure innovational products from private enterprises and public R＆D organizations to efficiently provide non-excludable public goods.Public discrimination often occurs and is controlled by contest designers.Our initial task is to clarify why this is indeed the case in the complex institutional environment based on buyer-determined reverse auction and rent-seeking theories.We consider situations under which equilibrium strategies exist and rent-seeking expenditures heterogeneous players choose in both imperfectly discriminating contest and perfect discriminating competition.We analyze the case in which players may have different values for the rent and their values are complete information.Under the perfect discrimination competition,the contest designer chooses the optimal value of discrimination based on the ratio of contestants＇ prize valuations.For low values of λ,where the parameter λ is the weight assigned to bidders＇ expected payoff,the designer wishes to extract buyer‘s surplus from the contestants so that the optimal bias accomplishes the designer＇s attempt to maximize the extent of competition between the contestants.For high values of λ,the designer wishes to maximize the total utilities of contestants and sets the optimal

关 键 词：公共产品技术创新 社会福利 政府偏袒 技术获取 

分 类 号：G304[文化科学]