基于完全理性和公平偏好的营销渠道委托代理模型比较研究  

A Comparative Study of Marketing Channel principal-agent Model Based on Entirely Rational and Fairness Preference

作　　者：丁川[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学运筹与决策研究所,四川成都610074

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2014年第1期185-194,184,共11页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(JBK120117);西南财经大学"211工程"青年资助项目(QN09-96)

摘　　要：营销渠道中的制造商和零售商常常是信息不对称的,与市场"零距离"的零售商比制造商有更多的信息,基于此,本文首先考虑渠道成员具有完全理性,建立了符合营销渠道实际的委托代理模型,通过模型分析发现:制造商给予零售商激励程度越大,零售商越努力销售其产品,但努力程度与零售价格、零售商的风险规避度相关,与批发价格无关。进一步,将行为经济学的公平偏好理论植入到渠道激励研究中,建立了基于公平偏好的销售渠道委托代理模型,其研究表明:渠道双方具有互惠式公平偏好时,当制造商给予零售商的最大固定工资和固定工资满足一定条件时,零售商愿意付出更多的营销努力;并且制造商越是慷慨地给予零售商更多的固定收入,零售商越努力销售制造商的产品。同时,和完全理性模型比较,考虑公平偏好时,制造商和零售商的收益都得到了帕累托改进,也就是说能够设计出帕累托改进的销售工资合同。最后还提出了有待继续研究的问题。Manufacturers and retailers in marketing channels often have asymmetric information.Retailers often have more market information than manufacturers because they are closer to the market.We assume that channel members are entirely rational,the principal-agent model is structured along with marketing channels,and incentive contract consists of two parts-fixed costs and the revenue of sales income.The results in the first model show that when the manufacturer gives a retailer more incentive the retailer will try harder to sell their products.However,the effort is associated with retail prices,and the degree of risk aversion of retailers,but not associated with the wholesale price.Furthermore,by embedding the fairness preference theory of the Rabin into the design of incentive,we have improved the principal-agent model.The results in the second model show that when the retailer＇s largest fixed wages and fixed wages meet certain conditions,retailers are willing to pay greuter marketing efforts.Consequently,manufacturers will give retailers more generous fLxed income,and retailers will put more efforts in selling manufacturer＇s products.When we consider the fairness preference theory,the actual revenue of manufacturers and rctailers has been Pareto improvement,and manufacturers may design a salary contract of Pareto improvement.This reciprocity thinking shows that if the retailer＇s cash flow is tight,the manufacturers will proactively request to delay the cost of ordering to hdp retailers obtain loans from financial institutions.The series of reciprocal actions will not reduce manufacturers＇ profits.On the other hand,retailers may make more efforts to sell products to preserve the reputation of the manufacturer.The ＂reciprocal＂ phenomenon is quite common for many companies in Japan and South Korea.

关 键 词：营销渠道 完全理性 公平偏好 委托—代理 激励 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F019