零售环节竞争、渠道势力与上游环节行业卡特尔  

Retail Competition,Channel Power and Upstream Cartel

作　　者：张昊[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院财经战略研究院,北京100045

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2014年第3期12-21,共10页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目"批发产业转型与内外贸联动发展政策协调研究"(13CJY097);中国人民大学科学研究基金项目"国内贸易活动的基础理论综合与研究方法创新"(13XNI009)

摘　　要：文章考察零售环节竞争与渠道势力对上游环节形成行业卡特尔的影响。结果表明,零售环节竞争加剧时,上游行业新产生的卡特尔趋于不稳定,已经存在的合谋也更有可能破裂。相反,零售环节垄断性增强时,现有的行业卡特尔更加稳定,并有可能形成新的稳定合谋。当零售商凭借渠道势力向生产商索取利润转移时,上游行业合谋更有可能形成,稳定性也随之增强。由此得到的启示是,竞争型的零售环节与产销对等的渠道势力将有利于防止上游稳定合谋的形成。This paper studies the impact of retail competition and channel-power on cartel in upstream industries with theoretical models. The results show that when the competition in retail section goes fiercer, the new upstream cartels will tend to be unstable, and the existing ones are more likely to break up. However, if the retail section becomes more monopolistic, existing cartels will be more stable and new stable ones are more likely to form. Furthermore, if the retailers using channel power to demand profit transfer from manufacturers, there will be more upstream cartels, which tend to be more stable. Thus, a competitive retail section and balanced channel-power distribution will be favorable for preventing stable cartels among upstream manufacturers.

关 键 词：零售竞争 渠道势力 卡特尔合谋 理论模型 

分 类 号：F713[经济管理—产业经济]