政治关系、预算软约束与过度投资——基于民营上市公司的经验证据  

Political Connection,Soft Budget Constraint and Over-investment ——Based On the Empirical Study of Private Listed Companies

作　　者：裘益政[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学财务与会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2014年第3期88-96,共9页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"创始家庭对上市公司价值影响机理研究"(71072137);浙江省哲学社会科学重点课题项目"浙江民营上市公司金字塔结构与债务资本成本研究"(11JDZS01Z)

摘　　要：文章以2007-2012年沪深两市A股民营上市公司为研究对象,考察在政治关系影响下民营企业的预算软约束和过度投资问题。研究发现,有政治关系民营企业存在预算软约束以及由此引发过度投资问题;在考察政治关系强度对预算软约束和过度投资的影响时,研究还发现,不同层级的政治关系对民营企业预算软约束和过度投资的影响程度不同,其中拥有省级政治关系的民营企业预算软约束和过度投资问题更为严重。文章对转变政府职能和完善市场机制具有重要的启示意义。Selecting the observations of A-share private enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2012, this paper investigates the soft budget constraints and over-investment in private enterprises with political connections. The results show that： the issues of soft budget constraint and over-investment do exist in private enterprises with political connections. Investigating the impact of the intensity of political connections on these problems, we find that the impact of different levels of political connections on soft budget constraints and over-investment may differ, in which the soft budget constraints and over-investment in private enterprises with provincial level political connections would be more serious. This paper has some significant implications in improving the market mechanism and the transformation of government functions.

关 键 词：政治关系 预算软约束 债务治理 过度投资 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]