基于导游过度自信的激励机制设计与分析  

Design and Analysis of Incentive Mechanism based on Tour Guide's Overconfidence

作　　者：鲁芳[1] 牛文举[2] 罗定提[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学财经学院,湖南株洲412007 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2014年第5期101-106,共6页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71201053);湖南省哲学社会科学基金(11YBA098)

摘　　要：传统的激励模型均假设委托方和代理方为完全理性的,但在旅游业中,如何对非理性(具体表现为过度自信)的导游实施有效激励是旅行社面临的更为实际的问题.利用博弈论和机制设计理论等,设计了不同信息条件下导游具有过度自信心理特征的激励机制,分析了过度自信水平对激励参数、服务努力水平、旅行社的期望效用和代理成本的影响.结果表明,与传统的激励模型相比,考虑导游过度自信的激励机制能进一步激励其提高服务努力水平,从而使旅行社的期望效用得到改善,并降低了代理成本.In traditional incentive models, both the principal and the agent are assumed rational, however, how the travel agency conducts effective incentive on the irrational tour guides （i.e., over confidence） is a more practical issue in the tourism industry. This paper, by using game theory and mechanism design theory, designs incentive mechanism with tour guide＇s over confidence under different asymmetric information, and then analyzed the impacts of level of over confidence on incentive parameters, level of service effort, expected utility of the travel agency and the agent costs. The results show that, comparing with the traditional incentive models, incentive mechanism with tour guides＇ over confidence not only can further enhance the level of service effort,but also can make the travel agency better off and therefore reduce the agent costs.

关 键 词：旅游业 过度自信 机制设计 非对称信息 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F590.6