不完全合约下PPP项目的运营期延长决策机制  

Analysis of decision-making mechanism for operation period extension of public-private partnership projects under incomplete contracts

作　　者：高颖[1] 张水波[1] 冯卓[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2014年第2期48-57,94,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71231006);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172149)

摘　　要：以最终用户付费的PPP项目为研究对象,研究了其需求量下降时,政府是否应当对私人部门进行运营期补偿以及如何补偿来实现私人部门收益和消费者剩余的帕累托改进.研究表明:1)并不是在所有需求量下降的情形下政府都应当对私人部门进行补偿,在有些情形下私人部门可以通过自行降价来实现其自身收益和消费者剩余的帕累托改进;2)在政府应当补偿的情形下,运营期延长机制在一定条件下能够实现私人部门收益和消费者剩余的帕累托改进,并且有效的运营期延长范围与政府和私人部门的运营成本以及各自的重新谈判成本有关.研究结果旨在为政府科学确定运营期的补偿范围提供决策支持.In this paper, we focus on public-private partnership projects whose revenue depends on charges collected from users. We investigate whether the government should extend the private sector＇ s operation peri- od when the demand unexpectedly declines so that Pareto-improvement can be achieved for both the private sector and consumers. Our results show that （ 1 ） in some scenarios the Pareto-improvement can be achieved by solely dropping price without need for an extension of the operation period; （2） when an extension is nee- ded to realize the Pareto-improvement, the added period depends on the operation costs and renegotiation costs of the government and the private sector, respectively. Our study intends to provide theoretical support for the government when making operation period extension decisions.

关 键 词：公私合营模式(PPP) 重新谈判 运营期 补偿机制 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]