检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
机构地区:[1]东北林业大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150040
出 处:《生态经济》2014年第4期72-74,共3页Ecological Economy
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(71140011);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(G201120);黑龙江省博士后科研启动资助项目(LBH-Q10180)
摘 要:国有林区在遏制森林砍伐和森林退化以及减少碳排放方面发挥重要的作用,为了更好地发挥国有林区森林生态系统的环境服务功能,就必须调动公众的积极性,通过政策体系的推动来实现全民参与国有林区建设的目标。由于森林生态资产价值的实现程度受到森林所在区域公众支付能力的影响,因此需要运用博弈理论和方法探讨森林生态资产运营过程中受益者的主观支付意愿,构建了一个生态补偿政策下的森林生态资产经营者和受益者之间的博弈模型。博弈分析表明:森林生态资产受益者的较高支付意愿是开展森林生态资产运营的基础。The state-owned forest areas play an important role in cubing deforestation, forest degradation and reducing carbon emissions. In order to make better use of the state-owned forest ecosystem environment service, we must arouse public enthusiasm to drive to achieve the target of all the people involved in the state-owned forest zone building through the policy system of government. Because realization degree of the forest ecological asset is influenced by public payment ability of forest region, therefore we use the game theory and method to explore the subjective willingness to pay of beneficiaries in the process of the forest ecological assets operations, and build a game model between the forest ecological assets operators and beneficiaries under an eco-compensation policy. Game analysis shows: a higher willingness to pay of forest ecological assets beneficiaries is the foundation to carry out the operations of forest ecological assets.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.38